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INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 4071 is the codification of the common-
law rule that excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures2 as
proof of an admission of fault.' The rule departs from the liberal
policy of admissibility embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence4 by
advancing the social policy of encouraging people to take steps in
furtherance of added safety by freeing them from the fear that such
steps will be used against them in a future lawsuit.' When negli-
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 states:
Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent remedial measures is
not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. EVIl. 407.
2. The phrase "remedial measures" has been interpreted broadly to cover virtually any
change, repair, or precautionary measure. See, e.g., Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d
1191,1197-98 (3d Cir. 1987) (excluding evidence ofwarning decal placed on defective hydraulic
press that ejected scrap metal during operation); Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408,
1417 (9th Cir. 1986) (excluding evidence of investigation and disciplinary measures taken after
police officer's violation of city policy on use of choke hold); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d
634, 636-38 (holding that admission of post-accident design changes to snow thrower was
reversible error), amended, 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d
84, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1979) (excluding evidence that guards had been placed around elevator
buttons to prevent accidental pushing after accident in which freight elevator doors prematurely
closed, striking plaintiff); Ford v. Schmidt, 577 F.2d 408, 410-11 (7th Cir.) (excluding evidence
of new prison regulations that would have avoided event in litigation if they had existed at time
in question), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978); Arcement v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 517 F,2d
729, 734 (5th Cir. 1975) (excluding evidence of construction changes after railroad trestle
collapse); Spurrv. LaSalle Constr. Co., 385 F.2d 322, 327 (7th Cir. 1967) (finding evidence that
guardrail was erected around pit at construction site after employee lost his balance and fell into
pit inadmissible to prove negligence); Armour & Co. v. Skene, 153 F. 241,244-45 (1st Cir. 1907)
(holding that evidence of discharge of employee responsible for accident in which runaway
horse team collided with plaintiffs buggy was inadmissible because employee was discharged one
year after accident). But see Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1579, 1580-81 (D.
Minn. 1988) (holding that evidence of intrauterine device (IUD) warning issued pursuant to
federal regulation mandating remedial measure is admissible where regulation was promulgated
prior to plaintiffs injury, even though effective date of warning was four months after IUD was
implanted).
3. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (pointing out that such conduct is equally
consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory negligence); Rimkus v.
Northwest Colo. Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060, 1064 (10th Cir. 1983).
4. SeeUnited States v. Carranco, 551 F.2d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 1977) (stating that Federal
Rules of Evidence favor admission of evidence over exclusion).
5. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note; Rimnkus, 706 F.2d at 1064; Werner v.
Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting that defendants would be discouraged
from making repairs if such repairs could be used against them at trial), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1080 (1981); see also Don Phillips, Crash Sharpens Focus on Train Contro4 Safety, WASH. POST, Feb.
20,1996, atAl (discussingTransportation Secretary Federico Pefia's announcement that federal
government was considering new rail-safety regulations in response to recentAmtrack accident).
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gencel is at issue, federal courts universally have applied the ex-
clusionary rule,7 which originated at a time when negligence was the
basis for most personal injury and property damage litigation.'
When a plaintiff's theory of recovery is not negligence, however, the
courts have disagreed on the applicability of Rule 407. In actions
based on products liability,1" a theory under which fault is arguably
irrelevant, the courts remain divided. 2
6. Negligence is the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person
would use under similar circumstances. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 32, at 173 (5th ed. 1984) (analyzing reasonable person standard and providing relevant
case law).
7. See, e.g., Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207-08 (1892)
(finding that evidence of subsequent repair to machine that was alleged to be constructed
negligently is inadmissible to prove negligence); Heilig v. Studebaker Corp., 347 F.2d 686, 689
(10th Cir. 1965) (holding that evidence of repairs made after injury sustained when brakes failed
during test drive is not admissible to prove negligence); Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Kelley, 74
F.2d 80, 85-86 (8th Cir. 1934) (holding evidence that railroad removed vegetation from tracks
after accident in which locomotive slid into railway cars inadmissible to prove negligence). For
a survey of courts adopting the exclusionary rule, see 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 283, at 175-84 n.1 (1979 & Supp. 1991).
8. Roger C. Henderson, Product Liability and Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures:
Resolving the Conflict by Recognizing the Difference Between Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64 NEB.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
9. CompareRaymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1522 (1stCir. 1991) (holding that
Rule 407 applies to strict liability cases) and Flaninio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469
(7th Cir. 1984) (barring evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability cases) with
Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497,506 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that Rule 407 does not preclude
introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability cases), cert. deniAe,
114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994). The debate surrounding the issue of whether Rule 407 should apply to
strict liability cases has been around as long as the rule itself. SeeAult v. International Harvester
Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151-52 (Cal. 1974) (raising issue with respect to state evidence rule enacted
one year before Congress enacted Federal Rules of Evidence). The debate has generated a
substantial amount of commentary. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 8, at 11-16 (arguing that
rule should not be applicable because of theoretical differences between negligence and strict
liability); Joyce M. Cartun, Note, Admissibility of Remedial Measures Evidence in Products Liability
Actions: Towards a Balancing Test 39 HASTINGS LJ. 1171, 1192-94 (1988) (emphasizing that Rule
403-type balancing test is appropriate standard for determining admissibility of subsequent
repairs); Michele B. Colodney, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 as Applied to Products Liability:
A Rule in Need of Remedial Measures, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 283, 284-305 (1993) (asserting that rule
should apply explicitly to strict products liability actions).
10. This Comment refers to "products liability" as an umbrella term that encompasses all
causes of action involving product defects. "Strict products liability" refers to a theory of
products liability that determines a manufacturer's liability based solely on a determination of
whether the product was legally defective. While the debate surrounding the applicability of
Rule 407 concerns only strict products liability, the proposed amendment of the Advisory
Committee, as explained in the Committee Note, uses the general term "products liability." The
analysis, however, is the same.
11. SeeRESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402A(2) (a) (explaining that theory ofproducts liability
holds product manufacturer strictly liable for physical injury caused to user even when
manufacturer exercised all possible care). But see infra note 67 and accompanying text
(explaining that strict liability standard actually applies reasonableness test).
12. Two federal circuits admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability
cases. See Burke, 6 F.3d at 506 (admitting evidence of post-accident decal and modification
programs); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir. 1983)
(admitting evidence of post-accident service bulletin warnings by airplane manufacturer), cert.
1456 THE AMERICAN UNIWPESITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1453
Recognizing the split in the federal circuits with regard to the
application of Rule 407,'" the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
has proposed an amendment to the rule.14 The proposed amend-
ment explicitly expands the scope of the exclusionary rule to cover
products liability actions. 5 In addition, the Advisory Committee
clarifies that the rule applies only to changes made after the event
giving rise to the litigation.16
This Comment argues that while the rule's expansion to cover
products liability actions is appropriate, limiting the scope of the
exclusionary rule to remedial measures taken after personal injury or
property damage in products liability actions is inconsistent with both
denied 466 U.S. 958 (1984). But the majority of the circuits hold that such evidence is
inadmissible. See, e.g., In rejoint E. Dist. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 995 F.2d 343, 345 (2d Cir.
1993) (excluding evidence of warnings on asbestos packaging); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970
F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1992) (excluding evidence of forklift design changes); Raymond, 938
F.2d at 1522 (excluding evidence of post-accident modifications to sideloader); Chase v. General
Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 22 (4th Cir. 1988) (excluding evidence of brake design changes);
Gauthier v. AMF, Inc, 788 F.2d 634, 637 (excluding evidence of design changes to snow
thrower), amended 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 469 (excluding evidence
of design changes to motorcycle); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d
883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983) (excluding evidence of design changes to gas tank valve); Hall v.
American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (6th Cir. 1982) (excluding evidence of policy change
regarding washing ship deck during storm); Dollar v. Long Mfg., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (1lth Cir.
1977) (admitting evidence of post-accident warning about backhoe for limited purpose of
impeachment), cert. denied 435 U.S. 996 (1978). While the District of Columbia Circuit has
never ruled on the issue, dictum in one unofficially reported district court case indicates that
the court would exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in a strict products liability
case. See Dine v. Western Exterminating Co., No. 86-1857-OG, 1988 WL 28241, at *2 (D.D.C.
1988) (stating that "[t]he majority of circuits perceive no distinction between strict liability and
negligence cases that renders inapplicable the policy underlying Rule 407 [and] ... [t] his court
is persuaded by the majority").
13. Memorandum from Professor MargaretA. Berger, Reporterfor the Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Evidence, to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence
2 (Sept. 19, 1994) (on file with The American University Law Review).
14. Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence to the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure (May 15, 1996) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report] (on file with
The American University Law Review). The text of the proposed rule states:
Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken
whieh- thab if taken previously, would have made the eyent injury or harm less likely
to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence,
ep culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need
for a warning or instruction in eennedfn w-h t .e.m This rlc dees ne.t ..
the.. ex..--^ e.. Evidence of subsequent measures may be when offered for another
purpose, such as impeachment or-if controverted-pr-ying proof of ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, "F eentrzeyened, er l, mpeacitnt.Id.
15. Id. (stating that evidence of remedial measure cannot be used to prove "a defect in a
product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction").
16. See id. (explaining that "rule applies only to changes made after the occurrence that
produced the damages giving rise to the action").
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the public policy behind the rule1 7 and substantive products liability
law.18 This Comment urges the Advisory Committee to reconsider
its proposed amendment.
Part I of this Comment provides background on both Rule 407 and
products liability law and discusses the conflicting approaches taken
by the federal circuit courts when applying the rule to actions based
on a theory of products liability. Part II analyzes the proposed
amendments to Rule 407. Subpart A considers the rationale for
applying the rule to products liability actions and concludes that this
approach is consistent with the social policy behind the rule. Subpart
B analyzes the Advisory Committee's decision to limit the scope of the
exclusionary rule to measures taken after the event giving rise to the
lawsuit. This section concludes that such a limitation is inconsistent
with both public policy and substantive products liability law. Finally,
Part III offers an alternative amendment to the exclusionary rule.
This alternative amendment expands the scope of the exclusionary
rule in products liability actions to cover remedial measures taken
after a manufacturer releases its product into the stream of com-
merce.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 407
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 states:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence
of the subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This
rule does not preclude the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving
ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment.
Most jurisdictions have long recognized the rule that evidence of
remedial measures made after an accident is not admissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct." The rule is based on the
common-law reasoning that a defendant's subsequent repairs are not
17. For a discussion of the public policy grounds that support Rule 407, see infra notes 37-
38.
18. For a discussion of products liability law, see infra Part I.B.
19. FED. P, EvID. 407.
20. See Berger, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that "majority rule" excludes evidence of
subsequent remedial measures in products liability cases); see also supra note 7 (citing cases in
which evidence of subsequent remedial measures was held inadmissible to prove negligence).
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necessarily an admission of negligence21 and that repairs should be
encouraged to reduce the possibility of further injuries.22
In 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the common-law formula-
tion of the exclusionary rule in Columbia &? Puget Sound RR. v.
Hawthorne.5 In this seminal case in which a worker was injured by
a pulley that unscrewed from a machine and fell on him, the Court
held that evidence of subsequently-added safety features was not
admissible to show fault.24  The Court reasoned that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures could not be used to prove negligence
because such evidence is irrelevant, confusing for the jury, and
prejudicial to the defendant 25 The Court explained that "taking...
precautions against the future is not to be construed as an admission
of responsibility for the past,"2  and that admitting evidence of
subsequent repairs is "an inducement for continued negligence."27
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 adopts both the common-law
formulation of the exclusionary rule and the two grounds traditionally
used to justify it, relevance and public policy.2 The Advisory
Committee Note explains that because remedial measures are "equally
consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory
negligence,"' the rule rejects the suggested inference that remedial
measures taken after an accident are an admission of fault.30 For
example, a product manufacturer may change a product's design
21. See Columbia & Puget Sound R.R v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 208 (1892). In Columbia
& Puget Sound RR., the Supreme Court noted that:
"[S]uch acts afford no legitimate basis for construing such an act as an admission of
previous neglect of duty. A person may have exercised all the care which the law
required, and yet, in light of his new experience, after an unexpected accident has
occurred, as a measure of extreme caution, he may adopt additional safeguards."
Id. (quoting Morse v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1890)).
22. See id. (stating that admitting evidence of subsequent repairs to prove negligence
"'virtually holds out an inducement for continued negligence'" (quoting Morse 16 N.W. at
359)).
23. 144 U.S. 202 (1892).
24. Columbia & Puget Sound, 144 U.S. at 207-08.
25. Id at 207.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 208.
28. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
29. FED. K. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note; see also Rimkus v. Northwest Colo. Ski
Corp., 706 F.2d 1060, 1064 (10th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that taking of subsequent remedial
measures is consistent with injury due to contributory negligence); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc.
v. Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that there are various
reasons why changes in design might be made after accident). See generally MORRIS K. UDALL
&JOSEPH M. LIVERMORE, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87, at 194 (2d ed. 1982) (stating that post-accident
changes are often motivated by factors other than consciousness of fault).
30. FED. R. EID. 407 advisory committee's note; see also FED. R. EVID. 801 (a) (defining
"statement" as "nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion"); FED.
R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) (A) (defining "admission" as party opponent's statement offered against him
in either his individual or representative capacity).
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because it has discovered a better design or because it wants to
implement an idea conceived before the accident.31  Because
evidence of a subsequent remedial measure addresses neither the
reasonableness of an actor's conduct nor the foreseeability of risk at
the time the conduct occurs, 32 courts should exclude the evidence
on the issue of fault because it is irrelevant.
33
The Advisory Committee points out, however, that the relevancy
ground by itself may not justify excluding the evidence in every
case.34  The Committee Note recognizes that under the liberal
theory of relevance adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence,35 "the
inference [of fault] is still a possible one." 6 To bolster the relevancy
argument, therefore, the Advisory Committee relies on what it calls
a "more impressive ground for exclusion,"' the social policy of
encouraging people to make safety improvements by eliminating the
fear that such changes will later be used against them as proof of
faultY8
31. See Grenada Steel Indus., 695 F.2d, at 888 (stating that manufacturer may have changed
product design only based on cost, acceptance in marketplace, or feasibility of making change
contemporaneously with others); see also Berger, supra note 13, at 23-24 (noting low probative
value and potential for confusion of subsequent repair evidence).
32. Randolph L. Bums, Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures and Strict Products Liability: A
New-Relevant-Answer to an Old Problem, 81 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1167 (1995).
33. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (stating that irrelevant evidence is not admissible).
34. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
35. The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as any "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID.
401; see also G. Michael Fenner, Evidence Review: The Past Year in the Eighth Circuit, Plus Daubert,
28 CREIGHTON L REv. 611, 619 (1995) ("Evidence need not be conclusive, or even persuasive,
to be relevant it need only make something of consequence to the action somewhat more or
less likely.").
36. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note; see also Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497,
505 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding subsequent remedial measure relevant to existence of dangerous
defect, causation, assumption of risk, and comparative fault), cert. deniea, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994).
According to Professor Margaret Berger, Advisory Committee Reporter, the rule's drafters"were
willing to risk losing some relevant evidence" for policy reasons of encouraging repairs. Berger,
supra note 13, at 23.
37. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note; see Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence
Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 303
(1973) (statement of Prof. Victor E. Schwartz) (stating that rule is based on substantive policy
goal of encouraging repairs).
38. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note; see Columbia & Puget Sound RR. v.
Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 208 (1892) (arguing that admitting evidence of subsequent repairs
to prove negligence is inducement for continued negligence). But seeNote, Products Liability and
Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DuKE LJ. 837, 848-50 (arguing that evidence of subsequent
repairs may actually encourage future remedial action to extent that admission of such evidence
results in recovery by injured plaintiffs).
14591996]
1460 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEw [Vol. 45:1453
The Committee Note also indicates that Rule 407 is not a complete
bar to the introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial mea-
sures.39 Pursuant to the second sentence of the rule, if evidence is
relevant to and offered on a controverted issue4 in the litigation
other than the defendant's negligence or culpable conduct, it will be
admissible for the limited purpose of proof on that issue.41 For
example, if a defendant denies ownership or control of the instru-
mentality in question, the plaintiff may introduce evidence that the
defendant subsequently took remedial measures with regard to the
instrumentality to prove either that the defendant owned the
instrumentality or that it was under the defendant's control.42
Further, if the defendant testifies as to the safe condition of the
instrumentality prior to an injury, the plaintiff will be permitted to
impeach this testimony through evidence of the subsequent repairs.43
39. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note (stating that subsequent remedial
measures may be used to demonstrate "ownership or control, existence of duty, and feasibility
of precautionary measures, if controverted, and impeachment").
40. The requirement that the issue be controverted calls for "automatic exclusion unless
a genuine issue be present and allows the opposing party to lay the groundwork for exclusion
by making an admission." FED. R. EID. 407 advisory committee's note. In other words, if a
manufacturer stipulates that an alternative design was feasible, feasibility is not a contested issue,
and evidence of the subsequent repairs cannot come in for this purpose. This requirement is
logical because ifan issue is not controverted, no evidence is needed to prove it. SeeRaymond
v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that feasibility exception is not
applicable where parties stipulated to feasibility). Rule 407 requires that evidence of a
subsequent remedial measure sought to be admitted under an exception must be controverted
because of the common law concern that the liberal admission of evidence under an exception
would undermine the public policy behind the rule. See generally 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAMJR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5286, at 131 (1980)
(reasoning that person contemplating remedial measure would be "no less deterred by
knowledge that his action might be used to show feasibility of precautionary measures than he
would by the fear that it might be offered to show negligence").
41. FED. R. EVID. 407.
42. See, e.g., Mehojah v. Drummond, 56 F.3d 1213, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
evidence that defendant erected fence between pasture and highway admissible to prove control
over and feasibility of building fence); Powers v.J.B. Michael & Co., 329 F.2d 674, 677 (6th Cir.)
(finding evidence that defendant posted danger signs after accident admissible "only as it tended
to prove that this part of the highway was under the control of the defendant"), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 980 (1964); Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322o 1328 n.4 (Colo. 1986) (stating
that defendant's belief that feasibility was controverted rendered evidence of ability to affix new
label admissible in warnings case).
43. See, e.g., Pitasi v. Stratton Corp., 968 F.2d 1558, 1560-61 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that trial
court committed reversible error in excluding evidence of ski resort's order to place warning
signs and ropes across entrances to trail immediately after skier's accident where defendant ski
resort stated that risk posed by trail was so obvious that there was no need for any warning);
Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co., 774 F.2d 1309, 1313-14 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that trial court
abused discretion in not permitting plaintiff to proffer evidence of remedial measures where
defendant argued that product in question was best and safest on market); Anderson v. Malloy,
700 F.2d 1208, 1212-14 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding that trial court erred in excluding evidence of
remedial measures to impeach defendants' testimony that they had taken every security measure
possible).
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Even when evidence of subsequent remedial measures falls under
one of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule, however, the court
retains discretion to exclude the evidence.'4  As the Committee Note
points out, the court must consider "the factors of undue prejudice,
confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and waste of time."' In
addition, if the evidence is admitted pursuant to an exception, that
evidence is subject to a limiting instruction at the opposing party's
request.46
Although the exclusionary rule clearly applies in actions based on
negligence,' courts are divided when a plaintiff seeks recovery
under a theory of products liability.48 Because neither the language
of Rule 407 nor the Advisory Committee Notes to the rule provide
guidance on the rule's applicability to products liability actions, courts
have relied on both the policy behind Rule 407 and the differences
between negligence and strict liability to support opposing positions.49
44. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing for exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by prejudice or confusion or is waste of time).
Nevertheless, despite restrictions on the admissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs to show
ownership or control or for impeachment purposes, courts seldom opt to exclude such evidence.
SeeJames J. Bolner, Jr., Note, Swalloing Rule 407 with the Impeachment Exception: Palmitter v.
County Board of Road Commissioners, 5 COOLEY L REV. 223, 223-33 (1988) (suggesting that
admissibility of subsequent repairs to impeach credibility of defense witnesses may render Rule
407's exclusionary function ineffective); Brent R. Johnson, Comment, The Uncertain Fate of
RemedialEvidence Victim of an Illogical Imposition of Federal Rule of Evidence 407,20 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 191, 215 (1994) (arguing that exceptions "swallow the rule" because of ease of which
plaintiffs avoid exclusion under Rule 407). Professor Saltzburg remarks that "[e]ven with the
rule as it stands, it has been said that an adept lawyer is almost always able to show a subsequent
repair for some permitted purpose." RICHARD O. LEMPERT&STEPHENA. SALTZBURG,AMODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 191-92 (2d ed. 1982). In effect, as one commentator has noted, the
exclusionary rule "has become a rule of general admissibility, subject only to the exception that
the evidence cannot be admitted to prove negligence." DebraJ. Hackford, Comment, The Case
for the Renovated Repair Rule: Admission of Evidence of Subsequent Repairs Against the Mass Producer
in Strict Products Liability, 29 Am. U. L REV. 135, 154 (1979). While the topic is outside the scope
of this Comment, this Comment proposes thatjudges exercise greater discretion in admitting
evidence under an exception to Rule 407 by admitting subsequent repair evidence only when
there is no alternative method of proof.
45. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
46. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (providing that, upon request, court shall instruct jury to limit
consideration of evidence that is admissible for one purpose but not another).
47. See FED. it EVID. 407 (stating that "evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not
admissible to prove negligence").
48. Seesupra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing split in federal circuits on question
of whether Rule 407 applies to actions brought under theory of strict products liability). For
a discussion of the theories of products liability, see Part II.B.
49. CompareRaymondv. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1522 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that
Rule 407 applies to strict liability cases) and Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469
(7th Cir. 1984) (barring evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability cases) with
Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497,506 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that Rule 407 does not preclude
introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability cases), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994). See infra Part I.C (discussing debate over applicability of Rule 407 to
strict products liability actions).
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B. Products Liability
Products liability is a tort liability rule applicable to manufacturers
and distributors of products, established by the existence of a defect
in a product at the time of sale or distribution." A plaintiff may
bring a products liability action alleging a manufacturing defect,5 1 a
design defect," or a defect due to inadequate instructions or
warnings53 under any one or a combination of the theories of negli-
gence, breach of warranty, or strict liability in tort. 4 Although each
of these theories of liability is distinct, 5 the desired result, namely
50. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402A cmt. g (explaining that strict products liability
applies only where product is unreasonably dangerous "at the time it leaves the seller's hands");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LTABILrry § 1(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT DRAFT] (stating that product defect is judged at time of sale or
distribution). This Comment discusses products liability law as it is stated in the Second and
Third Restatement Drafts.
51. A product contains a manufacturing defect"when the product departs from its intended
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the
product." RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 50, § 2(a).
52. A product contains a design defect:
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.
RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 2(b).
53. A product is defective due to inadequate instructions or warnings:
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the chain of distribution, and the omission of the
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 50, § 2(c).
54. See RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 50, § 2 cmt. m ("[T]he traditional doctrinal
categories of negligence, strict liability, or implied warranty of merchantability may be utilized
in doctrinally characterizing the claim."). For a discussion of the differences between the
theories of negligence and strict liability, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
55. For a plaintiff to recover successfully on a negligence claim, plaintiff must prove that
the defendant owed a duty of care, that the defendant breached that duty, that the plaintiff was
injured, and that the defendant's breach proximately caused the injury. SeeKEETON ErAL., sura
note 6, § 30, at 164-65 (outlining traditional elements needed to maintain negligence cause of
action). The focus in a negligence action, therefore, is on the defendant's conduct before and
at the time of the event that gives rise to the plaintiff's injury. See id. § 30, at 170 (explaining
that defendant's conduct "must be judged in the light of the possibilities apparent to him at the
time, and not by looking backward 'with the wisdom born of the event.'" (quoting Greene v.
Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 177 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1931))). Accordingly, negligence, which
focuses on the conduct of the manufacturer, might allow a finding that in distributing a
defective product, a "defendant with meager resources was not negligent because it was too
burdensome for such a defendant to discover risks or to design or to warn against them."
RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 50, § 1 cmt. a; see also Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d
1033,1037-38 (Or. 1974) (stating that greaterburden is placed on manufacturer in strict liability
than in negligence because law assumes knowledge of product's dangerous propensity that may
not be reasonable to expect in negligence).
Strict liability, on the other hand, holds the manufacturer "to the standard of knowledge
available to the relevant manufacturing community at the time the product was manufactured."
RESTATE ENT DnA'r, supra note 50, § 1 cmt. a. Unlike proof under a negligence theory, the
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that the manufacturer will bear the cost of placing a defective product
in the stream of commerce, is the same.56
Early products liability law focused on manufacturing defects, or
defects due to a physical departure from a product's intended
design." In the early 1960s, courts began to hold manufacturers of
defective products liable for the injuries caused by such defects
regardless of the fact that the plaintiff would be barred from bringing
suit under either a negligence or warranty theory.5" The rationale
behind such "strict" liability was that "a product unit that fails to meet
the manufacturer's design specifications thereby fails to perform its
intended function and is, almost by definition, defective."5 9
Design defects and defects based on inadequate instructions or
warnings, on the other hand, arise when the product conforms to the
intended design, but the design itself, or its sale without adequate
instructions or warnings, renders the product unreasonably danger-
ous.' In response to a number of restrictive rules that made
recovery difficult to obtain in cases of design defect or defect due to
inadequate instructions or warnings,61 in the 1960s, courts began to
impose liability without fault on manufacturers of products with
emphasis in strict products liability is on the product itself and not on the conduct of the
manufacturer. Id. But see infra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing use of negligence
standard in strict liability actions based on design defect and defect due to inadequate
instructions or warnings). Traditionally, under a theory of strict products liability, a plaintiff did
not need to prove that the manufacturer breached a reasonable standard of care in
manufacturing the product, but only that the product was legally defective. See Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962) (holding that plaintiff who was injured by
defective power tool was not required to prove anything other than that he was injured while
using tool as manufacturer intended). For a discussion of the factors that render a product
legally defective, see supra notes 51-53. The Third Restatement Draft places an additional burden
on the plaintiffto prove that the product was legally defective at the time of sale or distribution.
RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 50, § l(b).
56. The theory of strict products liability rests on two policy arguments. First, those who
support holding a manufacturer strictly liable for any damages caused by a dangerous product
the manufacturer places in the stream of commerce argue that manufacturers are better able
than consumers to bear the costs of damages. Because the manufacturer seeks to gain a profit
from its activities, it occupies a better position than the consumer to bear the cost of an injury
caused by that product. The second policy argument buttresses this economic rationale, putting
forth the proposition that manufacturers will exercise greater care in developing and producing
products if plaintiffs are not required to prove negligence. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50,
§ 2 cmt. a. This line of reasoning is consistent with the policy rationale behind Rule 407
because it encourages manufacturers to develop safer products. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text (discussing public policy behind Rule 407).
57. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1 cmt. a.
58. See Hennigsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 77 (NJ. 1960) ("Recovery of
damages does not depend upon proof of negligence or knowledge of the defect.").
59. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1 cmt. a.
60. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1 cmt. a.
61. See RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1 Cant. a.
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design defects62 and defects due to inadequate instructions or
warnings.0
The imposition of strict liability regardless of the product defect at
issue was predicated on the rationale of section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.e' Section 402A is a rule of strict liability that
makes the manufacturer of a defective product subject to liability even
though the manufacturer has "exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of the product."'
According to the drafters of the Third Restatement Draft, however, it
has become evident over time that section 402A, created to deal with
liability for manufacturing defects, cannot appropriately be applied to
cases of design defects or defects based on inadequate instructions or
66warnings. In response, the Third Restatement Draft states explicitly
62. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (noting that,
to establish manufacturer's liability, plaintiff need only prove injury occurred while using
product properly and as a result of defect of which plaintiff was unaware.
63. SeeAnderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549,558-59 (Cal. 1991). In
Anderson, the court held:
The rules of strict liability require a plaintiff to prove only that the defendant did not
adequately warn of a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the
generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at
the time of manufacture and distribution. Thus, in strict liability, as opposed to
negligence, the reasonableness of the defendant's failure to warn is immaterial.
Md For example, under this standard, a small manufacturer who releases a defective product
into the stream of commerce will be held liable for a consumer's injuries if it did not warn of
known risks that accompany the use of that product, even if it was not economically efficient to
do so given the relatively small risk involved. See supra note 74 and accompanying text
(explaining why courts consider products liability theories "strict").
64. See KEETON Er AL, supra note 6, § 98, at 694 (explaining that American Law Institute's
adoption of § 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts in 1965 led to its wide acceptance by
American courts as the rule for strict products liability). Section 402A provides:
Section 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402A.
65. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402A cmt. a.
66. See RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1 cmt. a. The Third Restalemnent Draft in
relevant part states:
A product unit that fails to meet the manufacturers design specifications thereby fails
to perform its intended function and is, almost by definition defective. However, when
the product unit meets the manufacturer's own design specifications it is necessary to
go outside those specifications to determine whether the product is defective.
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that design defects and defects due to inadequate instructions or
warnings are to be judged by a reasonableness standard' at the time
of sale or distribution, 6 a standard that mirrors the substantive
products liability law of many states.69
Nevertheless, even while imposing liability on manufacturers only
upon a showing that the product in question is "unreasonably
dangerous,"70 many courts continue to characterize the liability based
on this standard as being "strict."7" The authors of the Third Restate-
ment Draft explain that this "rhetorical preference" is the result of
several factors. First, if a product causes injury while being put to a
reasonably foreseeable use, the product manufacturer is imputed with
knowledge of the risks attendant to such use.72 Second, by charac-
terizing a claim in terms of strict liability rather than in terms of
negligence, courts can limit the introduction of defenses such as
comparative or contributory negligence. 7 Finally, by focusing on
the product rather than on the conduct of the manufacturer, courts
avoid a negligence standard that may be "too forgiving of a small
manufacturer who might be excused for its ignorance of risk or for
failing to take adequate precautions to avoid risk."74 Thus, while the
theory of strict liability may have become the "paramount" basis of
liability for product manufacturers,75 elements of the traditional
67. RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 50, § 2(b)-(c).
68. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § l(b).
69. See, eg., AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (1992) (providing that defendant shall not be
liable in products liability action if product conformed with state of the art at time that
defendant first sold product); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21403(1) (a) (1987) (stating that it shall
be rebuttably presumed that product was not defective if product conformed to state of the art
at time of sale); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (West 1987) (providing state of the art defense in
products liability actions); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105(a) (1980) (stating that manufacturer
or seller of product shall not be liable in products liability action unless product was
unreasonably dangerous or defective at time it left control of manufacturer or seller).
70. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402A. "Reasonableness" is the standard traditionally used
to determine negligence; see also supra note 6 (defining negligence as failure to use such care
as was reasonable under circumstances).
71. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1 cmt. a. See, eg., Ferguson v. F.R. Winkler Gmbh
& Co. KG, 79 F.3d 1221, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that second step in "determining
whether a seller should be strictly liable" is that "the product [must have been] sold in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer") (alteration in original); Lohr v.
Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1351 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that "strict products liability action
under Florida law would ask the jury" if product was "'in a condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user'" when it left possession of manufacturer (quoting Fla. StandardJury Mstr., § PL 4,
5)); Whitted v. General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that Indiana
law imposes strict liability on those who place into stream of commerce products that are in
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to consumers).
72. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1 cmL. a.
73. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1 cmL. a.
74. RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 50, § 1 CM. a.
75. JOHN W. WADE Er AL., TORTS 694 (9th ed. 1994).
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negligence theory have found their way back into the strict liability
scheme. 8
In response to the difficulty that courts have had in distinguishing
the theories of negligence and strict liability when determining
whether a product is defective, 7 the authors of the Third Restatement
Draft have provided the explicit criteria needed to establish the
existence of a defect in a products liability action.78  In addition to
offering a solution to much of the confusion that surrounds the
application of products liability law, the Third Restatement Draft
provides answers to the debate surrounding the applicability of Rule
407 to products liability actions.79
C. The Debate over the Applicability of Rule 407 to Actions Brought
Under a Theory of Products Liability
A split of authority has developed among federal courts on the issue
of whether Rule 407 encompasses claims for which fault is not at
issue."0 The debate centers on the distinctions between negligence
and strict products liability and on whether the policy of encouraging
repairs is comparable under each theory.
Only the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
have determined that the exclusionary rule is not applicable in
76. I&; see also RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 50, § 2 cmt. a (stating that design defects
due to inadequate instructions or warnings achieve same general objectives as does liability
predicated on negligence). Most courts agree that "[flor the liability system to be fair and
efficient," manufacturers should be held accountable for knowledge of "risks and risk-avoidance
techniques" reasonably attainable at the time of distribution. RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note
50, § 2 cmt. a.
77. See RESTATEMENT D]RAFr, § 1 cmt. a (noting that even though resolution of claims
alleging design defect and defect due to inadequate instructions or warnings requires application
of "reasonableness test," many courts "insist" on speaking of this liability as strict). For examples
of courts applying a reasonableness standard to "strict" liability actions, see supra note 71.
78. Section 1 of the Third Restatment Draft states that a product is defective if it contains a
manufacturing defect, design defect, or defect due to inadequate instructions or warnings at the
time of sale or distribution. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1 (b). Section 2 sets out what
is needed to establish each of the 3 types of defects under § 1. Id. § 2.
79. The Third Restatement Draft provides that the time of sale or distribution is the point at
which liability will be determined in a strict products liability action. RESTATEMENT DPAFr, supra
note 50, § 1(b). Accordingly, any knowledge that the manufacturer acquires after this point is
irrelevant. See id. § 2 cmt. a ("For the liability system to be fair and efficient, most courts agree
that the balancing of risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing must be done
in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the time
of distribution."). Application of the exclusionary rule to measures taken after this point,
therefore, is consistent with the application of the rule to measures taken after an accident or
injury in a negligence action. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text for a more detailed
discussion of the timing issue.
80. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing split in federal circuits on whether
Rule 407 applies to actions brought under theory of strict products liability).
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products liability actions based on strict liability.8 The reasoning
behind this theory is that the language of the rule expressly limits its
application to claims in which fault must be proven, 2 and that
because fault is irrelevant under a theory of strict liability," the rule
cannot apply.84 Further, proponents of liberal admissibility rules
argue that the social policy underlying Rule 407 is not applicable to
strict products liability actions because the economic interests of
manufacturers are promoted by taking remedial measures, and the
rules of evidence play no part in that determination.85
In refusing to apply Rule 407 to products liability actions, the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits follow the minority rule. These two
circuits adopted the rationale of the California Supreme Court in Ault
v. International Harvester Co.,8  which reasoned that because the focus
in strict products liability cases is on the product itself and not on the
manufacturer's conduct, the policyjustification for excluding evidence
of remedial measures does not exist.87 The court in Ault found that
the exclusionary rule's primary function is to encourage safety
measures.'s Thus, it concluded that the rule could be applied
logically only where negligence is at issue. 9 Further, the court
reasoned that it would be "manifestly unrealistic" to believe that a
manufacturer would forego making remedial measures to a defective
81. See, e.g., In rejoint E. Dist. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 995 F.2d 343, 345 (2d Cir. 1993)
(excluding evidence of warnings on asbestos packaging); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d
1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1992) (excluding evidence of forklift design changes); Chase v. General
Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 22 (4th Cir. 1988) (excluding evidence of brake design changes).
But seeBurke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 506 n.11 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that panel was bound
by circuit precedent and that issue should be reviewed by circuit en banc).
82. FED. R. EvID. 407 (stating that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not
admissible to prove "negligence or culpable conduct").
83. See supra part I.B (discussing products liability law).
84. See Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir. 1983)
(stating that Rule 407 does not apply where there is no issue of culpability).
85. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1974) (finding it
unlikely that producer would forego improving its product, thereby risking additional lawsuits
and negative publicity, solely because evidence of such improvements would be admissible); see
also 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND STATE COURTS 407[02], at 407-15
(1995) (arguing that even if manufacturers were as "cold-blooded" as rule suggests, it would be
risky to refrain from making needed repairs); cf. Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen
Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887-88 (5th Cir. 1983) ("1J]udgments concerning why manufacturers do or
do not alter their products, made by such dubious experts asjudges, lawyers, and law professors,
suffer from excessive reliance on logical deduction and surmise without the benefit of evidence
of industry practice or economic factors.").
86. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
87. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1974).
88. XL at 1151.
89. I.
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product, thereby risking more lawsuits with the possibility of punitive
damages and tarnishing its public image.g
The majority of the federal circuits reject the arguments in favor of
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures and extend the scope
of the exclusionary rule to apply to actions brought under a theory of
strict products liability.9' These courts reason that there is no
practical difference between strict liability and negligence in defective
design cases and the public policy rationale to encourage remedial
measures remains the same. 92  Moreover, proponents of the
exclusionary rule argue that the policy behind the rule is particularly
applicable to manufacturers because they are the defendants "most
likely to know about Rule 407 and be affected by the decision whether
to apply it."93
The majority rule employs a rationale similar to the one used by
the Fourth Circuit in Wrnwr v. Upjohn Co.94  In Werner, the court
found that, regardless of the theory used to require a manufacturer
to pay damages, the deterrent to taking remedial measures is the
same, namely the fear that the evidence may ultimately be used
against the manufacturer in a lawsuit. 5 Similarly, in Flaminio v.
Honda Motor Co.,95 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit explained:
One might think it not only immoral but reckless for an injurer,
having been alerted by the accident to the existence of danger, not
to take steps to correct the danger. But accidents are low-probabili-
ty events. The probability of another accident may be much
smaller than the probability that the victim of the accident that has
already occurred will sue the injurer and, if permitted, will make
devastating use at trial of any measures that the injurer may have
taken since the accident to reduce the danger.97
In short, a majority of the federal circuit courts have held that
admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures will discourage
manufacturers from instituting safety measures, regardless of whether
the claim is brought under a theory of negligence or strict liability."8
90. lI& at 1152.
91. See supra note 12 (citing cases that reflect split in circuits).
92. Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634,637 (citing Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d
463, 467 (7th Cir. 1984)), amended, 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986).
93. Id. (citing Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 470).
94. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980).
95. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-57 (4th Cir. 1980).
96. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
97. Flarninio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984).
98. See Berger, supra note 13, at 2-13 (providing survey of circuit court decisions on issue
of applicability of Rule 407 to strict products liability actions).
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II. ANALYSIS
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules has proposed the
following amendment to Rule 407:
Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event,
measures are taken w eh that if taken previously, would have
made the event iniury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence, -E
culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product's
design, or a need for a warning or instruction in zonnctidn .- ith
the .vt. This ru de. s net r...ir. the exlusien cf. Evidence
of subsequent measures may be when offered for another purpose,
such as impeachment or-if controverted pFevhng proof of owner-
ship, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if cent-rever -t
cd, or impea .hmont 9
The Advisory Committee proposes to amend Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 in two respects." ° The first change adopts the
majority rule of the federal circuit courts that Rule 407 should apply
to products liability actions.'O° The second change defines the event
giving rise to the lawsuit as the point after which evidence of remedial
measures will be excluded.102 The Advisory Committee emphasizes
that "[e]vidence of measures taken by the defendant prior to the
'event' do not fall within the exclusionary scope of Rule 407 even if
they occurred after the manufacture or design of the product."'
A. The Expansion of the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule to Cover Products
Liability Actions
The Advisory Committee points out in the Note to its proposed
amendment that the amendment "adopts the view of a majority of the
99. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14.
100. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14.
101. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14 (proposing to add language of "a defect in
a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction" to Rule 407).
102. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14 (suggesting that words "an injury or harm
allegedly caused by" be added to Rule 407 to clarify when rule applies).
103. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14; see also In reAircrash in Bali, Indon., 871 F.2d
812, 816 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding exclusionary rule not applicable to safety report prepared by
defendant before accident); Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 21-22 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that "event" referred to in Rule 407 is accident in question and that Rule 407 does not
exclude evidence with respect to changes made before that event); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co.,
573 F.2d 1332,1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (allowing into evidence document prepared before accident
that showed alternative fuel tank locations in claim based on negligent design of fuel tank);
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1579, 1580-81 (D. Minn. 1988) (finding no bar to
admission of FDA regulation promulgated one month before injury, although regulation did not
take effect until after injury).
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circuits that have interpreted Rule 407 to apply to products liability
actions."1 Although the Advisory Committee does not provide any
reasons for its preference for the majority approach, 5 an analysis
of the minority rule demonstrates its weaknesses and lends support to
the Advisory Committee's decision
06
The rationale for admitting evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in strict products liability actions is rooted in the theoretical
differences between negligence and strict products liability. The
argument follows that while liability in negligence is based on the
conduct of the manufacturer, strict liability focuses only on the
defectiveness of the product 7 Thus, because there is no negligent
conduct to influence in strict products liability actions, application of
the exclusionary rule arguably would serve no purpose. 03 For
example, a product manufacturer that negligently places a product on
the market will be held liable under a theory of strict liability for any
accident caused by that product, not because of the manufacturer's
negligence, but simply because it placed the product in the stream of
commerce.1
09
Courts that reject this rationale assert that the distinction between
negligence and strict liability does not justify a refusal to apply Rule
407.110 These courts recognize that regardless of the theory under
which a manufacturer could potentially be sued, if evidence of
subsequent remedial measures is admissible to prove liability, the
incentive to take remedial measures is greatly diminished.' Even
104. Advisory Committee Repor4 supra note 14; see Berger, supra note 13, at 2-13 (providing
survey of law in federal circuits and determining that majority apply exclusionary rule regardless
of theory of recovery).
105. Advisory Committee Report supra note 14. But seeAdvisory Committee on Evidence Rules,
Minutes of the Meeting4 (Oct. 17-18,1994), available in WESTLAW, US-RULESCOMM database
(discussing advisability of amending Rule 407 so as to impose uniformity throughout circuits and
to prevent forum shopping).
106. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the minority rationale
for admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict products liability actions.
107. SeeAult v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1974) (noting that
negligence actions focus on defendant manufacturer's conduct, whereas strict liability actions
focus on nature of product); see also Henderson, supra note 8, at 1-24 (arguing that Rule 407
should not be applicable in strict products liability actions).
108. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing argument that policy behind Rule
407 has no bearing in strict liability context). See gewrally Hackford, supra note 44, at 155-64
(discussing recent trend of courts, "misapplying negligence theory to strict liability").
109. But see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (stating that liability is actually based
on standard of reasonableness).
110. See Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that rule's goal,
to encourage remedial measures, is relevant to defendants sued under either negligence or strict
liability theory).
111. See, e.g., Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1276 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding no
difference in effect on defendant under strict liability or negligence cause of action); Gauthier
v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (believing rationale for exclusion of evidence-to encourage
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when a manufacturer's conduct is not affected by the rule's policy of
encouraging repairs, the majority rule recognizes that Rule 407's
applicability is no longer an issue; the manufacturer who has no
incentive or duty to make repairs after an accident will not, by
assumption, take any remedial measures.112 In other words, the rule
may have no impact on manufacturers who will not take remedial
measures for economic reasons. Rather, the rule protects those
manufacturers who do implement safety measures from having these
measures used against them.
Courts dismissing the distinction between negligence and strict
liability as "hypertechnical" focus on the realistic rather than the
academic implications of applying the exclusionary rule in strict
products liability.' These courts have pointed out that in a
product case in which injury or damage easily may have been avoided,
either by eliminating a defect or by warning the consumer of danger,
failure to apply the exclusionary rule will deter subsequent remedial
measures as strongly as in a negligence case. 4 In addition, even
though the imposition of strict liability relieves plaintiffs of the
burden of proving fault that they face in a negligence context, the
two theories cannot be so easily distinguished because of the
important role negligence continues to play in product suits 15
remedial measures-to be same under either theory), amended, 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986);
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that under either
theory, incentive to take subsequent remedial measures is reduced if measures may be used
against defendant); see also supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for
applying Rule 407 to strict products liability actions). But seeJohn M. Kobayashi, Products Liability
Lawsuits-Part I: Admissibility Questions and Miscellaneous Evidentiary Developments, 1981 TRIAL LAW.
GUIDE 297, 321 (arguing that anti-deterrent premise "does not nowadays seem to bear much of
a relationship to reality").
112. See Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 470 (stating that in cases where defendant would have no
incentive to take remedial measures because accident was unavoidable, Rule 407 is merely
"academic").
113. SeeGrenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883,888 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating that "real question is whether the product or its design was defective at the time the
product was sold" and not why manufacturer made particular design change to product after
accident); accord RESrATEmENT DRAFr, supra note 50, § 1(b) (stating that product should be
judged "at the time of sale or distribution").
114. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 470; see also Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir.
1981) (finding no significant distinction between negligence and strict liability theories and,
therefore, admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict products liability case).
115. SeePaul D. Rheingold, The EpandingLiability of the Product Supplier. A Primer, 2 HORSTRA
L. REv. 521, 531 (1974) (stating that to prevail by showing that defendant did something wrong
is easier than proving that product is technically defective). Almost every products liability
action contains a negligence count. WADE ET AL, supra note 75, at 699 n.4. But seeJames A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of
Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 277-78 (1990) (arguing that convergence of two theories
creates confusion).
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Courts that favor applying the exclusionary rule in strict products
liability also consider the probative value of subsequent repair
evidence." 6 These courts argue that the "real" question is whether
the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer's
control, and the jury's attention should be directed to what the
manufacturer knew or should have known at the date of sale or
distribution." 7 The introduction of evidence of subsequent modifi-
cations, therefore, potentially confuses the jury by diverting its
attention from whether the product was defective at the time it left
the manufacturer's control to what was done later."' Because of its
potential to alter the scope of the substantive law if admissible, the
majority approach excludes evidence of subsequent remedial
measures regardless of the theory under which the plaintiff seeks
recovery."9
The Advisory Committee's proposal to amend Rule 407 in accor-
dance with the majority rule is consistent both with the public policy
that supports the exclusionary rule and with substantive products
liability law. The first proposed amendment, therefore, should be
adopted.
B. The Problem of Applying the Exclusionary Rule to Post-Accident
Remedial Measures Only
Limiting Rule 407 to evidence of post-injury modifications is a
natural result of applying the rule as it is applied in negligence
actions. 2° This limitation, however, fails to do justice to the policy
116. Cf supra note 76 (citing sources that state that manufacturer will be held liable only for
knowledge reasonably attainable at time of distribution). Because manufacturers in such a case
are held to a negligence-like standard, the same relevancy grounds for exclusion are applicable.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing relevancy grounds supporting exclusionary
rule). Further, the probative value of post-sale, pre-accident remedial measures is obviously
more attenuated than post-accident measures, especially when that evidence is not corroborated
by evidence of other accidents. See infra part II.B (discussing problem of applying exclusionary
rule only to post-accident measures).
117. Grenada Steed Indus., 695 F.2d at 888.
118. 1&
119. Cf Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Brequet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th cir.)
(holding that "an announced state rule in variance with Rule 407 is so closely tied to the
substantive law to which it relates (products liability) that it must be applied in a diversity action
in order to effect uniformity and to prevent forum shopping"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984).
In light of Rule 407's potential to affect state law, the rule should conform to the Restatenent's
formulation of products liability law, as that formulation is a statement of what courts and
legislatures are doing around the country. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 6, § 98, at 694 (stating
that nearly every state has adopted liability for products as embodied in the Restatement).
120. Roger W. Frazier, Note, Excluding Subsequent Design Modifications in Product Liability
Litigation: The Propriety of a Post-Sale Versus a Post-Accident Exclusion, 29 ARIZm L REV. 621, 627
(1987). The issue of notice illustrates the problem with such an approach. See id at 629 n.49.
An accident puts a defendant on notice that some safety measure may be in order, and Rule 407
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goals supporting the application of the exclusionary rule in products
liability actions.121 The extension of the exclusionary rule's scope
to include post-sale changes would not conflict with, but rather would
supplement the goals of Rule 407 by encouraging manufacturers to
implement safety measures. 22
The differences between the theories of negligence and strict
liability are not significant enough to require different approaches
when it comes to the goal of not deterring manufacturers from
implementing safety measures."m One difference between the two
theories that cannot be overlooked, however, is the issue of tim-
ing. 1 24  Under a negligence theory, a manufacturer who alleviates
the danger of a product before injury occurs cannot be held liable for
the subsequent injury because the manufacturer will not have
breached a duty of care at the time of the injury, regardless of its
earlier negligence." In strict products liability, however, the act for
which the manufacturer may later be liable is the release of the
product into the stream of commerce.126
is designed to encourage such action. Id Manufacturers who take pre-accident remedial
measures, however, lack such notice. IdL Thus, if the rule excludes only post-accident repairs,
manufacturers are given no incentive to take remedial measures unless and until an accident
occurs. Id. at 630.
121. Frazier, supra note 120, at 627; see also Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191,
1198 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding policies support application of exclusionary rule when subsequent
remedial measures are offered as admission that product was defective at time of sale);
Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, 719 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Ariz. 1986) (excluding pre-accident
changes to encourage remedial measures that help decrease danger of future accidents).
122. See Readenour, 719 P.2d at 1062 ("[T]he extension of the prohibition to include (post-
sale] pre-accident change fosters the same policy as that embodied in Rule 407."); see also
Colodney, supra note 9, at 305 (stating that social policy of encouraging repairs is not served if
Rule 407 is limited to post-injury measures in case of products causing injury that may not
surface for years, such as radiation or prescription drugs). The decision to extend the scope of
the exclusionary rule to cover post-sale changes would not affect the strict liability imposed for
manufacturing defects. See supra note 76 (stating that different standard applies for design
defects and defects due to inadequate instructions or warnings).
123. See supra part 11A (arguing that expansion of scope of Rule 407 to cover strict liability
actions is consistent both with public policy behind exclusionary rule and with substantive
products liability law).
124. See Frazier, supra note 120, at 628-29 (noting courts' failure to consider timing issues
and describing impact of applying same timing considerations in both negligence and strict
liability cases).
125. Frazier, supra note 120, at 629.
126. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing time at which product is deemed
defective for purposes of establishing liability). A"stricter" strict liability scheme would hold the
manufacturer accountable for everything known or knowable about the product up to the date
of the trial. See Burns, supra note 32, at 1161 (determining such "hindsight" liability would
resemble absolute liability). Such a practice is inconsistent with the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures both before and after an accident. Id. at 1161-64. According to
one commentator, evidence of a scientific advancement or development in design theory after
the product was sold should be admissible only to prove a duty to warn. Hackford, supra note
44, at 142.
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Because the time of sale or distribution is the point in time at
which liability will be determined in a strict products liability
action, 127 any product knowledge acquired after the point of distri-
bution is irrelevant.18  If evidence of a remedial measure taken
before injury occurs may be used against the manufacturer in a
subsequent lawsuit, the manufacturer will lose the incentive to take
the measure until after injury has occurred. 2 9 Extending the scope
of the exclusionary rule to cover post-manufacture, pre-injury
modifications, therefore, serves the policy goals of Rule 407.1"
Further, if Rule 407 operates to admit evidence of remedial measures
taken after the time of distribution, it will expand the scope of liability
by holding a manufacturer responsible for knowledge acquired after
the time at which it released the product to the public.' In other
words, the Advisory Committee's proposed Rule 407 would have the
potential to alter substantive law." 2
The Third Circuit currently stands alone in expanding the scope of
the exclusionary rule to cover pre-injury remedial measures. 13 3 The
127. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1(b).
128. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402A cmt. g (stating that liability attaches only when
product is in unsafe condition when it leaves seller's hands); RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note
50, § 2 cmt. c (stating that plaintiff in products liability case must prove reasonable alternative
was available at time of sale).
129. See supra note 120 (illustrating problem with limiting exclusionary rule's scope to post-
accident repairs).
130. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (arguing that similarities in approach
taken under negligence and strict liability render policy goals behind Rule 407 equally applicable
in both cases).
131. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing implications of applying Rule 407
to substantive law). Although the Advisory Committee considered the issue, it adopted the
majority view that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in diversity cases; see also Berger, supra
note 13, at 2 (stating that no circuit, with possible exception of Tenth, views issue ofsubsequent
repair evidence in substantive terms); Renee Dosick, Note, The State of the Art Defense and Time
Rule in Design and Warning Defect Strict Liability Cases, 38 RuTGERS L. REV. 505, 521-36 (1986)
(discussing implications of post-sale versus post-injury exclusion on substantive law).
132. The importance of the question has been summarized as follows: "The subsequent
repair rule, though superficially a procedural-evidentiary rule, has an important substantive
impact on the law of products liability. The rule's application, or its nonapplication, can have
great consequences in a products liability suit." Joseph M. Costello & Michael Weinberger, The
Subsequent Repair Doctrine and Products Liability, 51 N.Y. ST. Bus. J. 463, 499 (1979).
133. See Berger, supra note 13, at 22-23; see also Rollins v. Board of Governors for Higher
Educ., 761 F. Supp. 939, 940 (D.R.I. 1991) (stating that public policy underlying Rule 407 is not
served by admitting evidence of subsequent repairs, even if decision to make repairs was made
prior to incident being litigated); Frazier, supra note 120, at 626-30 (arguing that date of sale
as effective date for excluding evidence of subsequent design modifications is more consistent
with underlying policy goals of Rule 407 and with theory of products liability as embodied in
§ 402A of Second Restatement); cf. Uniform Product Liability Act § 107(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,728
(1979) [hereinafter U.P.LA.]. The U.P.LA. states in relevant part:
(A) Evidence of changes in (1) a product's design, (2) warnings or instructions
concerning the product, (3) technological feasibility, (4) "state of the art", or (5) the
custom of the product seller's industry or business, occurring after the product was
manufactured, is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the product was
1474
FEDERAL RuLE OF EVIDENCE 407
court explained its reasoning in Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc.,13 4 a
case involving a decal warning of possible injury from improper use
that the defendant affixed to all of its hydraulic presses manufactured
after 1980.135 The plaintiff, whose employer purchased a hydraulic
press in 1959, was injured by the machine in 1983.136 Finding that
Pennsylvania imposes strict liability for manufacturers whose products
are defective at the time of sale, the court determined that the
plaintiff could recover only if injury from a particular use was
foreseeable at the time the product left the manufacturer's con-
trol. 7 The court explained that when the manufacturer's liability
was predicated on a theory of failure to warn regarding improper use
of the product by the consumer, the negligence concept of foresee-
ability had insinuated itself into the strict liability cause of action."3
The court concluded that "the policies supporting Rule 407 counsel
exclusion of proof of subsequent remedial measures when offered in
strict liability cases as an admission that the product was defective at
the time of sale."" 9
Those who oppose expanding the rule to cover pre-injury remedial
measures do not believe that manufacturers will be discouraged from
making repairs when an accident has not yet occurred."4 In a
memorandum to the Advisory Committee, Professor Margaret Berger,
the Committee Reporter, recommends that the Committee adopt this
rationale in its amendment to Rule 407.141 To further support this
recommendation, Professor Berger states that evidence of pre-injury
remedial measures is probative, citing as an example the situation in
which a manufacturer changes its product design after delivery to the
public but before any injury." Although Professor Berger states
defective in design under Subsection 104(B) or that a warning or instruction should
have accompanied the product at the time of manufacture under Subsection 104(C).
Id. Several states have similar legislation. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-6-87 (1992 & Supp.
1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-404 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 6-1406 (1990). But see Patton v.
Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1311 (Kan. 1993) (discussing Kansas' products
liability statute that is similar to U.P.LA. but excludes phrase "at the time of manufacture" and
therefore includes post-sale duty to warn).
134. 887 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1989).
135. Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 887 F.2d 34, 36 (3d Cir. 1989).
136. I&
137. Id. at 36 nn.3-4, 40; Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191, 1194-95, 1198 (3d
Cir. 1987).
138. Petree, 831 F.2d at 1198.
139. Id.
140. See Berger, supra note 13, at 24 (stating that application of rule to pre-injury measures
addresses "hypothetical future cases-cases especially hypothetical because no accident has yet
occurred." (citing Taylor v. Husquarna Motors, 988 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1992))).
141. Berger, supra note 13, at 24.
142. Berger, supra note 13, at 24.
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that this situation has bearing on the issue of failure to warn, 43 she
fails to address how it bears on the issue of product defect. This
Comment argues that while pre-injury repair evidence may be
probative on the issue of failure to warn, it is not probative of the
issues that Rule 407 addresses.
The Advisory Committee's proposal to limit the scope of Rule 407
to post-accident measures is inconsistent both with the public policy
that supports the rule and with substantive products liability law. The
second proposed amendment therefore should be reconsidered.
III. RECOMMENDATION
Consistent with substantive products liability law and the public
policy of encouraging manufacturers to take steps in furtherance of
added safety, the following recommendation for amending Federal
Rule of Evidence 407 should be adopted:
Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures
(a) In an action based on a theory of negligence and in which
.n, after ant event, measures are were taken whieh after the
event giving rise to the action that, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct.
(b) In an action based on a theory of design defect or defect due
to inadequate warning or instruction and in which measures were
taken after the event that put into the stream of commerce the
product that causes personal injury or propery damage, and that,
if taken previously, would have made the personal iniury or
property damage less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
remedial measure is not admissible to prove a defect in a product,
a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruc-
tion.
(c) This -ul de. net r-..r- the .xel.isin ef Evidence of
subsequent remedial measures may be when offered for et*heF
Pt r..ese sue impeachment or, if controverted peing proof of
ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures&-4
eentrcverted, er impeaehment.
In accordance with the public policy of encouraging repairs that
supports Rule 407, the recommendation outlined in this Comment
excludes evidence of remedial measures taken after an event that
gives rise to litigation, regardless of the theory under which the action
is brought. This recommendation is consistent with the Advisory
Committee's proposed amendment to Rule 407, which expands the
143. Berger, supra note 13, at 24.
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scope of the rule to actions brought under a theory of products
liability.
In addition, the recommendation outlined in this Comment
expands the scope of Rule 407 in products liability actions even
further by excluding evidence of remedial measures taken after a
manufacturer releases its product into the stream of commerce.
Because substantive products liability law does not hold manufacturers
liable for product defects that were not known or knowable at the
time of sale or distribution," the Advisory Committee's proposed
amendment, which excludes only evidence of remedial measures
taken after the event giving rise to the litigation,"4 allows for the
introduction of post-sale, pre-accident remedial measures. Such
evidence is highly prejudicial and is irrelevant to the issue of liability.
Unlike the Advisory Committee's proposed amendment, this
Comment's recommendation complements substantive products
liability law by excluding evidence that is irrelevant to a determination
of liability.
Further, the recommendations set forth in this Comment would
have the practical effect of applying Rule 407 in an even-handed
manner to all product litigation. Thus, in cases in which a plaintiff
brings suit under theories of both negligence and strict products
liability,'46 the exclusionary rule would apply to all evidence of
product modification made after the time at which the manufacturer
releases its product into the stream of commerce.
CONCLUSION
The primaryjustification of Rule 407 is to encourage manufacturers
to take steps in furtherance of added safety. Accordingly, the rule
must reflect this policy in theory as well as in application. The
Advisory Committee's proposal to amend the scope of the
exclusionary rule to cover strict products liability actions supports the
policy of encouraging safety measures. Limiting the scope of the
exclusionary rule to measures taken after personal injury or property
damage, however, undermines the policy of the rule because it does
not protect manufacturers at the point in time in which the remedial
measures can be beneficial to the public. With the expansion of Rule
407 to cover actions brought under a theory of strict products liability,
144. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 50, § 1 cnn. a.
145. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14.
146. SeeKaren A. DiLisio, TheAdmissbliy of SubsequentRemedial Measures in a Products Liabiiy
Case,3 PROD. LIAB. LJ. 222, 237 (1992).
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this Comment urges the Advisory Committee to adopt a definition of
"event" that is consistent both with the public policy supporting the
rule and with substantive products liability law.
